The Washington Huskies finally entered the AP Poll and CFP rankings during their bye week but the glory was short lived. The Dawgs travelled to Madison and faced off against the Wisconsin Badgers in the battle of UWs, where they were ultimately upset 13-10. The Big 3 of Demond x Jonah x Denzel all got injured during the game, which showed how reliant the offense is on the trio as the team struggled to effectively move the ball. Inconsistency continues to be a theme with the team this year, which can be attributed back to the overall depth and youth on the roster. They return home this week to hopefully right the ship and finish out the season strong.

To the film.

Offense: When It Rains, It Pours

I don’t know how else to describe this offensive performance other than a disappointment. Of course, there were a plethora of factors that contributed to the offense’s collapse. Injuries piled up, weather conditions were less than ideal (not an excuse as a Pacific Northwest team), ineffective special teams leading to missed scoring opportunities & bad field position, etc. However, what was most frustrating to some fans was the general sense of unpreparedness and flat energy for an opponent who hasn’t won a game since week 2 and hasn’t scored more than 14 points since week 3. Considering that the Huskies were averaging 35.5 points per game heading to Madison, even an awful performance scoring half our average should’ve (and would’ve) been enough to win the game.

Unpreparedness and flat energy are generalities and don’t really get to the crux of the issue though. After re-watching the game, in my opinion the real issue is our offense’s inability to pivot the focal point of the offense away from our star trio of Demond Williams, Denzel Boston, and Jonah Coleman. Not only that, when Coleman can’t get going on the ground, which has been the case in our three losses and our comeback win against Maryland, Demond has had to play ‘hero ball’ to make up for it. It’s awesome to have a QB who’s that type of difference maker, but that much responsibility on your QB (not to mention the lack of any alternatives) can lead to back breaking miscues when he starts to force the issue.

Let me show you what I mean.

2nd Quarter – 4:03 – 1st & 10

First up we have this awful interception that was completely out of character for Demond. By this point in the game, Denzel had gotten banged up, but the offense had marched down the field pretty well on this possession. After turning the ball over on downs and consecutive 3 & outs on the first three possessions, it felt like the momentum was turning in the Huskies favor after consecutive scoring drives (albeit one very short one). The problem being here is that Demond started to play hero ball and made an ill-advised pass.

You can see things better from the all-22 angle from the broadcast replay, but on this play we’re facing a 2-high shell with both CBs playing off coverage. Pre-snap that would suggest that the defense is playing Cover 4, but Wisconsin rotates post-snap into Cover 3. Against this, the offense is running a concept that I’m not familiar with, so I’m not sure exactly what the progression should’ve been. However, it does appear like Roebuck, the intended target, was running a slot Fade/Wheel that was more of a decoy or “alert” read rather than a featured route in the play. It’s subtle, but you can see him throttle down just a bit just past the 30 yard line as he recognizes that the CB is staying on top of him. Only after he sees the ball in the air does Roebuck step on the gas to make play on the ball.

Now it’s also important to point out that Demond was facing pressure up the middle as Geirean Hatchett was getting bull rushed into his lap. This possibly sped up Demond’s progression, but at a minimum it impeded his vision over the middle. I’ve brought up in the past my lingering questions about Demond’s comfort passing over the middle, or at least his preference to pass downfield or to the perimeter. His preferences could be skewed by the all too common plays like this where he’s facing interior pressure, but it’s particularly noticeable on this play because he has a wide open Chris Lawson (WR, #8) over the middle on a Drag route. Lawson made the heads up decision to breakoff between zone defenders and squared up to Demond to present a bigger target, but by that point Demond had already made up his mind to chuck the ball to Roebuck.

At the beginning of this play I mentioned that this was an uncharacteristically bad decision for Demond. I say that not only because of his low interception rate and high completion percentage but also because of his tendency to make the right decisions based on pre-snap and post-snap coverage looks that we’ve broken down here on Film Study. If the pre-snap look suggested Cover 4 as I noted above, Demond should’ve known that Roebuck’s route wasn’t likely to get open but an underneath route against 3 zone defenders might. If Demond saw the post-snap safety rotation into Cover 3, Roebuck’s route would’ve still been a low probability pass against a CB playing off coverage. If in neither scenario Roebuck’s route was a good idea, then I’m left thinking that he had made up his mind to throw to Roebuck before they even broke the huddle. Roebuck’s clearly his second favorite target after Denzel, and if he’s forcing the ball to him because he doesn’t trust his eyes or his other targets then he’s just playing hero ball trying to make something happen.

The result of this play was unfortunate, and I think this is something that Demond will learn from and correct. However, it’s also a play that’s symptomatic of a QB that’s gotten too used to playing in a system that’s emphasized match up-based big plays instead of one that allows lets the scheme shoulder the burden.

3rd Quarter – 7:18 – 3rd & 12

Next up we have the strip sack fumble that gave Wisconsin all the momentum in the game midway through the 3rd quarter. What I wanted to focus on with this play isn’t so much the play design or concept but instead the play call and thought process itself. Backed up on our side of the field in a 3rd & long situation and with injuries already mounting across the offense, Fisch made the decision to call a quick pass play out of an empty formation.

Fisch’s propensity to lean on empty formation when dealing with strong pass rushes/weak protection is a tendency that I’ve noticed from the beginning of Demond’s tenure as our QB. Go back and check out the second half of last year’s Penn State game or the Oregon game. In both instances, Fisch called far more empty formation plays than he usually does. In theory, I can understand his logic. By emptying the backfield, you can force the defense to spread out in coverage, thereby minimizing the number of potential rushers and getting them to tip their hand in coverage.

The downside to this strategy is that the defense is facing less of a run threat and can sell out against the pass. Hypothetically, Demond’s dual threat ability mitigates their ability to tee off on him, but only to a certain extent. Yes, he’s a scrambling threat, but we rarely call designed runs out of empty formations. If an opponent has a containment strategy, or they’re in a favorable down and distance situation like they are here, then we’re not really any better off in an empty formation than any other formation.

One other key to a successful empty formation counter to pressure is a quick trigger QB who can distribute the ball to wherever the defense allows. That skill set isn’t Demond’s forte at this point in his career, at least outside of RPOs. On this play, he probably tucks the ball a split second too quickly before receivers got open (see Vines-Bright #7 at the bottom of the screen).

Another factor that confused me when it came to Fisch’s play call was the health of our offensive line. At this point in the game we were working with a back up center and right tackle, as well as a less than 100% left tackle and left guard. When running empty protection, the offense simply has fewer blockers to help out weak spots and more 1v1s. To be successful in empty protection, where defenses can run more exotic pressures and stunts (like they called here) without the worry of a run play, you need an offensive line that can hold up reasonably well across the board in 1v1 protection. On this play, Willis gets beat inside on the twist (possibly because his knee injury is still hampering his mobility and anchor), and Demond has to dance around in the backfield to try and make something happen.

Unlike the last play, this is a situation where Fisch’s play call forced Demond to play hero ball, but yet again it resulted in a back breaking turnover.

4th Quarter – 5:25 – 3rd & 3

Finally this week we have a play where I simply don’t understand the design and have no idea how we’re setting up Demond for success. For context, this play is from the second to last possession when we knew it was coming down to crunch time. Yet again we’re in bad field position, but at least it was a 3rd & short/manageable situation. Initially this play looks like a wide receiver screen to Roebuck on the short side of the field. However, after rewatching the play a few times, I’m less sure what the intent of the play was.

If you ignore my poor attempt at drawing up the play like they do on the replay (the good graphics come from Awgs) and just focus on the routes, the first thing that you’ll notice is that we have a bunch of players converging on a very small area on the short side of the field.

Here’s a snippet from the point when Demond hit the top of his drop back, which is typically the point at which the play has developed enough to give a clear read for the QB. Not only are Roebuck and Vines-Bright (#7) the only two receivers looking for the ball, but they are basically standing right next to each other. Plus, Adam Mohammed is running right behind Vines-Bright, further compressing their spacing. Neither Vines-Bright nor Mohammed look like they are running to make blocks, so the only explanation I could think of is that could make any sense was that we were trying to run a fake screen with Vines-Bright trying to leak up the sideline behind the boundary CB. Unfortunately, Wisconsin has a free rusher coming off the edge on a zone blitz call who forces Demond off his spot.

With this last snippet, you can see the fully developed play a split second after Demond has to pull the ball down to evade the rush. Yes, Vines-Bright appears to be getting open behind the CB, but no one other than Roebuck and Vines-Bright are remotely open. Mohammed, Boston, and DeGraaf are all standing at or near the line to gain, but are being blanketed by four defenders and have terrible spacing. It can sometimes be difficult to determine if the receivers ran their routes poorly and ended up with bad spacing, but based on the play design, I don’t feel like the blame should go to them.

Long story somewhat shorter, Fisch seems to have called a set piece shot play designed to go to Vines-Bright, but the rest of the play design appears to have put our other receivers in bad positions to give Demond alternate options if the play went sideways. Yes, the protection broke down before the play was fully developed, but even if Demond had a little more time, I don’t think there was going to be anyone remotely open at or beyond the sticks other than Vines-Bright.

This is just another example of Fisch failing to set the offense up to succeed in a tight spot.

Awgs’ Bonus Play(s) of the Week

Shoutout to Denzel for always making these type of plays in the red zone.