The Washington Huskies ended the regular season on a low note, as they fell to the 0regon Ducks 26-14. In what seemed like a constant theme with all big games this year, the defense showed up and kept the game close and manageable for as long as they could. Meanwhile Demond and the offense sputtered, eventually showing signs of life but by that time it was too little too late. The team proved once again they are not fully ready to compete with the upper echelon of the B1G, let alone the CFP. It was a disappointing end to the season for the team, especially the senior class – most notably Denzel Boston and Jonah Coleman, as we will likely watch them on Sundays next year. However, it was still an overall improvement from last season and the foundation is there to continue to be built upon.

To the film.

Offense: Evolving to Match the Strengths

In a game full of highs and lows, this week we’ll be focusing on a couple of positives from the offense. While we weren’t able to consistently convert possessions into points, the offense put forth a performance that probably surprised fans on the ground. After struggling mightily last season in Eugene, the Husky offense actually out rushed the Ducks. Riding the hot hand of sophomore RB Adam Mohammed, who’s workload and production has noticeably grown down the stretch, the Huskies posted 154 yards on the ground on 33 carries. A significant portion of his output against Oregon came on under center runs that have become a key feature within the offense during the same stretch that Mohammed’s role has grown.

While those under center plays have become more important, we also wanted to highlight the ways that Fisch has schemed up the core concepts of his offense to be formation agnostic. When coaches talk about being multiple, this is what they mean. Let’s dive into the offensive plays for some examples.

3rd Quarter – 8:02 – 1st & 10

In his second straight 100+ yard performance, Adam Mohammed (#24, RB) seemingly seized next year’s RB1 role. After middling performances throughout last season and the first half of this season, the switch finally flipped for Mohammed. He’s always been a tough runner, but questions had lingered about how well he’d perform as a lead back handling larger volume. Would he be efficient enough to gain consistent down-to-down yardage? Did he possess the vision and agility to make up for imperfect blocking? Did he have the explosiveness to gain chunk yardage like Coleman? All of those questions were answered enroute to a 7.5 yard per carry average on lead back volume this past weekend.

So the question might be asked, what caused the switch to flip towards the end of the season? Well, some of it has to be attributed to his continued growth and development now that he’s finishing his second full season. He certainly seems more confident making his cuts at the line. However, I think a lot of credit has to be given to the staff for tailoring the run schemes to better suit his skill set. Mohammed is a different style of runner than Jonah Coleman. While both are tough runners with tackle breaking ability, Coleman is a naturally shiftier running back whose style of running involves a lot of lateral movement both in the open field and in a phone booth behind the line. That style of running is better suited to thrive in a shotgun-based run scheme where the back can more easily bounce or cut back runs to a wider range of gaps across the front.

Mohammed on the other hand is more of a one-cut type of runner that is best suited to hit cutback lanes against a defense that is flowing with the run. Guys with a similar running style who played in a Zone-heavy scheme, such as Arian Foster and Alfred Morris, are notable because of their impressive production at the NFL level without elite athletic traits.

As you can see on this play, we’re running a Mid Zone run out of an under center singleback formation. This is a core run concept in our offense, and we’ve run versions of this out of both shotgun and under center formations, and it’s been run with any of our running backs. What makes this version work better for Mohammed is how it changes his run angles and sets up his run with additional horizontal stress on the defense. Zone runs, whether its Inside Zone, Mid Zone, or Outside Zone, utilize the same blocking assignment structure but target different gaps. Inside Zone targets the play side A gap, Mid Zone the B gap, and Outside Zone the C gap. The wider the targeted gap, the more horizontal movement the OL usually gets and the faster the defense needs to flow to maintain their gap integrity. Mid Zone gets the best of both worlds by allowing the linemen use either reach blocks to seal the edge or drive blocks to push horizontal movement against the DL.

Using his deeper alignment in the backfield out of an under center formation, Mohammed is better able to build up speed while pressing the point of attack. This forces the defense to flow hard towards the perimeter, opening up a cutback lane that Mohammed hits with minimal loss of speed. Given his size and tackle breaking ability, Mohammed’s cut against the flow of the defense leaves few defenders in a position to square up on their tackle attempts, and he’s able to easily break free of a few arm tackles for a nice gain.

Don’t be surprised to see more of these Mid Zone runs and under center formations as Mohammed assumes the lead back role next year.

4th Quarter – 9:01 – 4th & 8

The other play we wanted to feature from the offense is this TD play to Denzel Boston in the 4th quarter. The play features some nice execution, particularly from the offensive line to buy Demond time for the routes to develop. However, this play design should look familiar to Husky fans since we scored a touchdown on this exact concept a week prior against UCLA, albeit with some interesting window dressing and formational designs that set the play up nicely.

The passing concept is a Crossers design that we broke down in the UCLA Film Study. The Crossers concept centers around the two deep crossing routes from opposite sides of the formation, but Fisch recycles all three routes from the UCLA version of the play for this one.

As you can see in both the UCLA and Oregon clips above, we have the two crossing routes with the third and final route being a checkdown route into the field side flat. With those routes, Fisch also pairs a 7-man protection to buy Demond time in the pocket. The difference between the two plays from the QB perspective is the formation and alignments that we’re running the play out of. The different formations and alignments present a different look for the defense to process without adding any significant complexity to Demond’s progression or read. This is what can be considered a “cheap” form of multiplicity in an offense because it takes relatively little added practice time to install since the core components of the concept stay consistent.

These cheap formation tweaks to the core concept also allow the staff to incorporate wrinkles that can set things up for key players and primary targets. Kevin Potts, who’s been posting some pretty interesting film study notes on Twitter, pointed out one interesting wrinkle from this play to set Boston up.

All in all, this play is a good example of how Fisch is trying to keep the offense multiple and unpredictable without deviating too far from his favorite handful of concepts.

Defense: Growing Pains

The defense, like the offense, has come a long way since last year’s matchup. Trench play has improved dramatically, both through out the season and since last year. As we’ve discussed at various times over the last month of the season, it appears like Ryan Walters and the defense have found their identity and a winning formula. Unfortunately for the defense, that winning formula of zone defense and a mixture of 1-high and 3-high coverage shells (Tampa 2) isn’t without weaknesses. Without Tacario Davis locking down one side of our defense against one of the two most explosive offenses we faced all year, the weaknesses became clearer. Dylan Robinson performed admirably in his spot, and I’m excited to see how he develops over his career. However, at the end of the day, chunk yardage through the air became the difference in the game.

Let’s take a look at a few examples from the defense.

3rd Quarter – 6:28 – 1st & 10

Against Oregon our pass defense was taken advantage of in two main ways. One of which was down the sideline over the top. As we mentioned earlier, with Tacario Davis unavailable against Oregon, true freshman Dylan Robinson (CB, #6) was pushed back into the starting line up. Robinson has played impressively in his previous stints this season filling in for Davis, and while he’s young, he’s still found ways to make an impact playing physically at the line of scrimmage against the run and as an open field tackler. Where the difference between Davis and Robinson shows up more noticeably is in downfield coverage. Despite being a similar size and possessing similar athleticism as Davis, Robinson doesn’t have the refined coverage skills that Davis has.

In general, we’ve had more success playing Robinson out of zone coverages that keep him near the line in the flats with help over the top. 2-high coverages, or Walters’ new favorite change up 3-safety Tampa 2, are great for Robinson. However, much of Walters’ defensive structure is built around 1-high coverages. Early in the season that meant Cover 1, but later in the season that shifted towards more Cover 3. That emphasis on 1-high coverages is intended to help us get an extra body in the box to defend against the run. On this particular play, we’re running Cover 3 with Oregon backed up inside their own 10 yard line, and the Ducks are running a Verts concept. Typically, you’d expect the QB to target a receiver up the seam between the deep safety and the outside CBs, especially when the CBs are playing off the line. However, Dante Moore also recognizes that the outside WRs are essentially in 1v1 coverage on the outside. With the WR putting a little stutter move on Robinson to get him out of position, Moore rips a pass up the sideline to a 45-yard gain.

Now given that we had a lot of success against Oregon’s run game (to the tune of just 2.5 yards per carry allowed), I don’t know if the net result would’ve been better if we had played more 2-high coverages to protect Robinson against the deep ball. What I can say is that we were asking a lot of Robinson to take on an explosive passing game with limited help over the top. If the game plan was to force Dante Moore and the Oregon receivers to beat us (a reasonable game plan), then all I can say to them is good game and we rolled the dice and lost.

4th Quarter – 8:06 – 3rd & 9

The other area that Oregon did damage against our pass defense was over the middle on intermediate routes behind the LBs. Like I mentioned for the last play, we played a ton of Cover 3 against Oregon, likely to stack the box against the run while still playing into our players’ zone coverage strengths. The Oregon staff picked up on this later in the game and found ways to torch us on a couple of big gains.

On this play, Oregon scored their final touchdown of the game on a Yankee concept where the solo Wrs to the top of the screen is running a deep Dig route and their outside WR on the far opposite side is clearing out the secondary with a Post route. As you can see from the All-22 angle, we’re rotating late into a Cover 3 look with Alex McLaughlin (DB, #12) bailing into deep center field coverage and our LBs bailing out of a pressure look. GIven the down and distance, and the fact that we’re playing spot drop style zone coverage, our LBs and other coverage defenders at the second level are only bailing about 10 yards to the sticks to defend the first down marker. With the deep Dig being run at about 15 yards deep the WR was going to find space behind the LBs, and since our CBs have deep coverage responsibilities outside the hash, they weren’t going to play the in-breaking routes aggressively.

This is exactly how the coverage is design to be played. No one defender blew their assignment, and most of the easier options were covered, leaving just the most difficult passes open. On the deep Dig, Moore had to layer in the pass above the second level defenders but in front of the deep coverage DBs. Despite the WR having plenty of space around him, it’s actually a pretty difficult throw to complete from the QB’s perspective. Like I said earlier, if the game plan was to defend the run and takeaway easy completions to force Moore to win the game with his arm downfield, this is just an example of him doing so. Good game by our defensive players, but a better game for Oregon.

Awgs’ Bonus Play(s) of the Week

Another week of calling the play call prior to the ball being snapped – this time ending with a much more positive result, with this slant-flat concept.

Note from Coach B: Clearly Awgs has been playing too much CFB 25… or maybe he’s just been paying attention to Film Study 😉