One of the most important jobs that a teacher does is adjust their lesson. We do that on a daily basis in the high school classroom. Sometimes students show that they didn’t get what we taught, so we have to find another way to teach it to them. Sometimes they demonstrate that they already know it, so we have to move onto the next thing. Something similar is happening with bases per out. Some people get it and some people don’t get it. My aim with this segment is to teach and I can’t afford to leave anyone behind.

Baseball statisticians and statisticians in every sport are constantly looking for single numbers that can encompass everything a player contributes. This is where wins above replacement came into vogue. The aim is to take something as complex as hitting, base running, and fielding and combine them to get an idea of what the total value of the player is.

BPO= Total Bases + Walks + Hit by pitch + Stolen bases / Outs

The number one rule is that no single number can describe everything a player does. In the case of bases per out, I am trying to explain both hitting and base running. The median BPO for semi-regulars in 2025 was .678. The median at second base (again with regulars and semi-regulars) was .645. That becomes important as we look at not only Jose Altuve, but also Mauricio Dubon and Ramon Urias. The club traded Dubon for the player with the lowest BPO in baseball. They simply non-tendered Urias. Can we make these moves make sense? I will try.

This is a gentle reminder that BPO+ and BPOP+ is the player’s percentage score when compared to the median overall hitter (BPO+) and median second baseman (BPOP+). A 100 score is average at both slots. So, Altuve was slightly above average overall and considerably above average when compared to second baseman. Dubon and Urias are obviously considerably separated from the average at both.

I have to say this again for effect. Outs are the life blood of the sport. The key to offense is that you get 27 of them in a standard game. A team could have a 350 million dollar payroll or a 75 million dollar payroll. They still get 27 outs. Their pitchers have to get 27 outs. So, bases per out is a representation of the amount of damage a player creates per out. Simply put, you want the players that create the most damage responsible for the majority of the outs.

Jose Altuve created the most outs on the Astros in 2025. That happened for a couple of different reasons. First, he was easily the most durable player on the team last season. Secondly, he always hit pretty high in the batting order. His .708 was not only better than the league average and the positional average, but it was also better than the team average of .651. So, having Altuve in the lineup on a regular basis still serves the team well.

Having Dubon in the regular lineup doesn’t serve them nearly as well. He was 6th on the team in outs, so while he may not be listed as an everyday player, he served that way in 2025. This becomes important when comparing him with Nick Allen (we will profile him with shortstops). They are nearly equal defensively, but Allen is considerably worse offensively. So, how does it make sense? Simply put, there is no way in hell Allen is creating 300 outs. He likely won’t even create 150 outs.

So, who gets those other 150 outs? This presents an opportunity for the Astros. The Astros have two possibilities here. If they keep both Christian Walker and Isaac Paredes then they effectively have an extra infielder. They could shuffle those players around and essentially absorb the utility infielder slot. Both Walker and Paredes are obviously better than Dubon and Urias offensively. The other option is to employ more young players like Brice Matthews. Would Matthews be better than Dubon and Urias offensively? Even if he doesn’t eclipse their numbers then then he couldn’t do much worse.

I should point out that one of the things we teach in Economics is the concept of the law of marginal utility. The lay man’s explanation is that each slice of pizza is less satisfying than the previous one. In baseball terms, spending a combined ten million dollars for Mauricio Dubon and Ramon Urias might produce a combined three wins. That seems impressive until you consider that someone has to take their innings and at bats when they are gone. In all likelihood those players will produce something and they will do so for a fraction of the cost.

While Urias and Dubon might produce say one more win than the combined contributions of lesser players, we have to consider where that ten million dollars might go. What player or players could the team invest in and how much better would they be then the players they are replacing? So, it is never as simple as Mauricio Dubon for Nick Allen. It is Dubon for Allen AND whoever the Astros can afford to bring in with the money they saved in that exchange.

It becomes a jigsaw puzzle. The difference between Dubon and Allen is likely between four and five million dollars. Add Urias and you save another two or three million. That by itself doesn’t really amount to much. However, if you combine that with other trades you might make then you are suddenly talking a significant sum. If you deal Jesus Sanchez and/or Jake Meyers and suddenly you might be talking about affording a middle of the rotation arm.

Any trade has to make sense in a larger context. Does Dana Brown have an overall vision for the roster? What is that overall vision and how easy or difficult will that be to execute? Dubon was a fan favorite and a two time Gold Glove winner. Allen probably could have been the Gold Glove winner at short in the NL last season, but no one in their right mind would say that is an even swap. Getting a slight upgrade for a few dollars more might make sense for the Braves. Shaving a few million might make sense for the Astros when the whole picture comes into view. Let’s see what that long-range plan is.

This doesn’t mean that these moves will all work out. We aren’t necessarily putting on the orange colored glasses here. It just means we need to wait until March or April to see what the final roster ends up looking like before we judge one way or the other. It could turn out better. It could turn out worse. Even then, our assertions might be wrong based on how these players actually play. It has happened before. It will happen again.